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ABSTRACT
This paper studies various extensions of the minimax
principle to select unique optimal behavioral strategies in
zero sum games in extensive form. Formal comparisons of the
different extensions are carried out in the context of zero
sum sequential games with incomplete information. There it
appears that the various extensions are related to different
approaches to the exploitation of the opponent's mistakes.
1. Introduction
Our basic motivation ｾ ｳ to understand the rationale
associated with an optimal behavioral strategy in a zero sum
game defined in extensive form.
The traditional approach to solve such games is to reduce
them to their normal form and derive the optimal behavioral
strategies from the optimal mixed strategies. This procedure
has the conceptual drawback of not providing much insight for
the extensive solution. Furthermore it has the technical
drawback of enlarging the dimension of the problem considerably
(while the dimension of the behavioral strategy set grows
linearly with the number of information sets in the game tree,
the dimension of the mixed strategy set grows exponentially),
as a result the optimal mixed strategies are in general non
unique though the optimal behavioral strategy might be unique.
(This of course generates some frustration after tedious
computations!)
Some recent approaches, however, propose direct procedures
to solve games in extensive form I}l, H-R, wJ. All these
approaches use the fact that optimal behavioral strategies are
"Bayesian" in the sense that they maximize the conditional
expectations at each information set given the other player's
optimal strategy. Now, there is a difficulty in this fact,
it concerns non optimal play. Indeed after a non optimal
move, conditional expectations might not be mathematically
defined. The purpose of this paper is to extend the Bayesian
interpretation in this precise case.
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Three £-Bayesian extensions will be studied, first a
"normal" one in which each pure strategy has to be played
with a small probability £ and an "extensive" one in which
each personal information set has to be reached with a small
probability £. These extensions were suggested by John
Harsanyi. A third extension due to Melvin Dresher [D] will
also be studied. Formal comparisons will be made in the
framework of zero sum sequential games with incomplete
information [p-ZJ.
2. The Main Ideas
This section presents the ma1n ideas by means of examples.
The first example is elementary; it demonstrates why non-
uniqueness arises after a non optimal move. However, in this
case, the non uniqueness is trivially solved. In the second
example, each extension will generate a different optimal reply.
2.1 An Elementary Example
Consider the following zero sum game in extensive form
1n which Player 1 1S the maximizer and Player 2 the minimizer.
Player 1
1
Player 2
The normal form of the game is
c d
a 1 -1
b o o
Clearlyconvex
Player 2's optimal strategy 1S non un1que and may be any
combination of (Oc + Id)!J and (1/2c + 1/2d).
if Player 2 wants to maximize his conditional expectation if
he gets to play he should select (Oc + Id) and any intuitive
rationale would call this his optimal reply. The reason why
the normal form fails to identify this unique solution is
1/ (ac + (l-a)d) means that Player 2 selects move c with
probability a and move d with probability (I-a). This
notation is used consistently. .
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simply because it is concerned with unconditional expectations.
Whatever Player 2 does after move a contributes nothing to the
unconditional payoff so long as move a remains a mistake.
2.2 The Main Example
The zero sum game described by the following game tree
may be interpreted as a one stage simplified poker. Player 1
receives one card which may be low (L) with probability 2/3
or high (H) with probability 1/3. Then he may drop (D), raise
1 unit (Rl) or raise two units (R2). If Player 1 raised then
Player 2 may drop (d) or call (c). There is one unit in the
pot at the beginning of the game and the payoffs have been
computed so that Player 1 is the maximizer.
o
CHANCE PLAYER1
1
ＢＭｈｾ］ｾＭＭＢＢＢＧＳ
Ｑ］Ｚ｜ｾｾ｟ＭＱ
-1
1
-8=:::::::]==== -2
PLAYER 2
The normal form of this game is already quite large:
ｐ ｾPlayer dd 2 ) dc cd cc
DDl ) 0 0 0 0
DRI 2/3 2/3 -2/3 -2/3
DR2 2/3 -4/3 2/3 -4/3
RID 1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3
RlRl 1 1 0 0
RlR2 1 -1 4/3 -2/3
R2D 1/3 1 1/3 1
R2Rl 1 5/3 -1/3 1/3
R2R2 1 -1/3 1 -1/3
Player l's optimal mixed strategy 1S un1que: (2/3 R2D, 1/3 R2R2).
Player 2's optimal mixed strategy set has four extremal points
MSl: (1/3dd, Odc, 1/3cd, 1/3cc)
MS2: (Odd, 1/3dc, 2/3cd, Occ)
MS3: (1/6dd, 1/3dc, 1/2cd, Occ)
Ms4: (1/2dd, Odc, 1/6cd, 1/3cc)
However its optimal behavioral strategy set has only 2
BSl: (1/2d + 1/2c
BS2: (1/3d + 2/3c
Rl) and (2/3d + 1/3c
Rl) and (2/3d + 1/3 c
R2)
R2)
(It is early seen that MSI and MS2 collapse into BSI and,
MS3 and Ms4 into BS2).
1) (D,D) stands for (drop with a high card, drop with a
low card) and so on.
2) (d,d) stands for (drop if Player 1 raises 1, drop if
Player 1 raises'2) ｡ ｮ ｾ so on.
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Hence this second example 1S similar to the first one in the
sense that non uniqueness occurs after a non optimal move,
namely move Rl. BSI and BS2 are the two extremal behavioral
strategies (just as (1/2c + 1/2d) in example 1) such that Rl
remains a mistake. Note that Player 2's optimal behavioral
strategies guarantee that he should not pay more than 5/3 if
the card is Hand 0 if it is L. Now the exploitation of the
mistake should somewhat improve these security levels.
How to improve them is another story as we shall see.
Let us first get a clearer picture of the situation by
drawing a diagram of Player 2's conditional expectation
given Rl.
L
1
ｏｾＭＭＭＭＭＬｾＭＮＬ［｣ＭＭＭＭＭＭ｟ｊＮＮＮＭ｟ＭＭＭＭＭＭｴ
-1/3
-1
H
2
5/3
3/2
1
PROS (HI
PLAYER 2 ' S CONDITIONNAL EXPECTATION
GIVEN R1
FIGURE 1
Mathematically speaking this expectation conditional on
Player lIs optimal strategy does not exist since Hl should
never be played. Taking a normal point of'view any convex
combination of BSl and BS2 makes good sense since it
guarantees that HI is dominated and should not be played. It
operates like a threat and the precise exploitation of the
mistake becomes somewhat irrelevant. Now in the game in
extensive form the rationale should be just the reverse:
threats ought to be explicitly modelled as at what time they
can be made binding and known to the opponent, whereas the
precise exploitation of a mistake becomes interesting since
it may very well be committed and known.
Coming back to our example, the exploitation of the
mistake HI is controversial since it would require the know-
ledge?f the a posteriori probability Prob (H I Hl). Taking
a Bayesian view, once an assumption about Prob (H I Hl) is
made, Player 2's best reply is determined. However note that
any convex combination of BSI and BS2 can only be consistent
with Prob (H I Hl) = 2/3. This in turns implies a great deal
about how HI may be played, namely Prob (HI I H) =
4 Prob (HI L). So that
Prob ( H I HI) = Prob (H)"Prob (HI H)
Prob (H)"Prob (Hl H) + Prob (L)"Prob (HI L)
= 1/3"4 Prob (HI
(1/3" + 2/3"1) Prob L)
= 2/3"
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Now comes a difficult dilemma:
(i) either Player 2 wants to select his behavioral
strategy among the convex combinations of BSl and
BS2 and be consistent with game theory but he has
to admit that he is acting as if the mistake was
committed in some very specific way,
(ii) or Player 2 makes a behavioral assumption about how
the mistake was committed, derives a conditional
probability which may be different from 2/3 and
maximizes his expectation at this point but he has
to admit that if Player 1 were to know Player 2'5
strategy then his behavioral assumption would not
make sense (playing Rl migh not be a mistake any
longer) .
We may refer t'o (i) as a "tricky opponent" and to (ii) as a
"stupid opponent". Clearly in a practical setting one approach
might be more appropriate than the other. Nevertheless since
obviously there is not much to say along·the "stupid line" we
propose to pursue a little longer the "tricky line". We shall
examine three extensions of the game solution concept each of
which will ordinarily determine a unique behavioral strategy
for Player 2.
2.2.1. Extension 1
In this extension we shall simply assume that Player 2
wants to maximize the expected penalty given the a priori
probability on H or L of (1/3, 2/3) but constrains himself
to the convex combinations of BSI and BS2. This procedure
generates a ｵｮｩｾｵ･ optimal behavioral strategy which clearly
is BS2 (see figure 1).
We shall demonstrate later on that this extension is
associated with the following assumption on Player lIs behavior:
Player 2 assumes that Player 1 has to make a mistake
(move Rl) when he gets a low card and when he gets a high card
the probability of the mistake being at least E.
2.2.2. Extension 2 (Dresher)
This extension consists in restricting Player lIs pure
strategy set to those which are not best replies to Player 2's
optimal strategy set and in restricting Player 2 to rema1n in
his own optimal strategy set [D}.
matrix game.
In this case we obtain the
..E.,;layer 2 .
Player .l - BSI BS2
DD 0 0
DRI 1/2 5/9 -
RID 0 0
RIRI 1/2 1/3
RIR2 5/9 1/3
R2D 0 0
R2Rl 1/2 5/9
and Player 2's ｵ ｮ ｩ ｾ ｵ ･ optimal strategy is (4/5 BSI + 1/5 BS2).
Player lIs "optimal mistakes" may be any convex combination of
(4/5 DRI + 1/5 RIR2) or (1/5 RIR2 + 4/5 R2Rl). Note however
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that for any of these combinations Prob (Rl I H) =
4 Prob (Rl I L) and so Prob (H I Rl) = 2/3.
We may now determine the penalty associated with Player 2's
strategy (see figure 1):
- if the card is H, Player 2 can guarantee to lose no
more than 5/3, but if Rl is played then he will obtain
1/5 - 5/3 + 4/5 - 3/2 = 23/15 thus he will be better
off by 5/3 - 23/15 = 2/15.
- if the card is L, Player 2 can guarantee to lose no
more than 0, but if Rl is played then he will obtain
- 1/5 1/3 + 4/5-0 = - 1/15 thus be will be better off
by 0 + 1/15 = 1/15. Since the priori probability of
H is 1/3 and of L is 2/3 he will be better off equally
well 1n a priori expectation basis whether the card is
H or L.
We shall demonstrate later on that this extension is associated
with the following assumption on Player lIs behavior:
Player 2 assumes that Player 1 has to make a mistake (move
Rl) with a small probability E, Player 1 may decide to make
the mistake with a low or a high card, but the overall probability
of the mistake has to be at least E. Then Player 2's optimal
strategy will generate the same expected penalty (on an a priori
basis) whether the card is L or H.
2.2.3. Extension 3
Taking a strictly Bayesian view, Player 2 should select
his strategy by taking into consideration only the payoffs
associated with move Rl, the a posteriori probability on
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Hand L and his conditional security levels. Following this
line, we shall propose the following behavioral assumption:
Player 2 will select his strategy so as to maximize the
expected penalty at the a posteriori probability distribution
and Player 1 will select,this a posteriori probability
distribution so as to minimize the penalty.
In the matrix form the game is
Player 1
!Player 2 d c
H 2/3 -1/3
L -1 1
1n which the entry (H, d) is computed as follows given that
Rl is played the payoff with a high card is 1, since Player 2
can guarantee himself 5/3, the penalty is 5/3 - 1 = 2/3.
The other entries are computed similarly.
Player 2's optimal behavioral strategy is (4/9d + 5/9c) if Rl
is played. Note that this coincides with(2/3BSI + 1/3BS2).
The best a posteriori probability for Player 1 is:
Prob (H I Rl) = 2/3. Finally note that the conditional
penalties incurred by Player 1 are identical and equal to 1/9.
Indeed, we shall demonstrate later on that this is one of the
significant properties of this extension. We shall also prove
that an equivalent behavioral assumption to the one underlined
above is:
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Player 2 assumes that Player 1 has to make a mistake
with a small probability E, Player 1 may decide to make the
mistake with a low or high card but the overall probability
of reaching the information set Rl has to be at least E.
3. E-Bayesian Solutions for Zero Sum Sequential Games
with Incomplete Information.
We shall now formalize the extensions presented in section
2 for the class of zero sum sequential games with incomplete
information I}-ZJ.
3.1 Definition of the Game and its L-P Formulation
The game consists of four steps:
Step 0: chance chooses a move k E K according to a
probability distribution po = ＨｰｾＩ k E K.
Player 1 1S informed of the move chosen by chance,
Player 2 1S not.
Step 1: Player 1 chooses a move 1 £ I. Player 2 is
informed of the move chosen by Player 1.
Step 2: Player 2 chooses a move j £ J.
Step 3: Player 1 receives an amount ｡ ｾ ｪ (a real number)
from Player 2.
(We assume that K, I, J are all finite sets).
be a behavioral strategy for Player 1kLet x = (x')k K . I1 E ,1£
k
such that x. = Prob (i
1
k) and y = (y1) be aj iEI,j£J
ibehavioral strategy for Player 2 such that y. = Prob (j Ii).
J
Then Player 1 and Player 2 optimal behavioral strategies are
the solutions the linear programs LPI and LP2 respectively. [P2]
(See also [H-R] for a general formulation of Bayesian equilib-
rium in non-zero sum games with incomplete information).
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Max [ Min [ 0u. Pkvk
iEI 1 kEK
j EJ, iEI [ 1 0 k 0 kEK, iEI [ 1 1 > 0u. - akjPkXi < v k - ak·y·1 J J -kEK jEJ
kEK [ k 1 iEI [ 1 1x. = y. =
iEI 1 jEJ J
kEK, iEI k 0 iEI, jEJ 1 > 0X. > y.
1 - J -
(LP1) (LP2)
The optimal values of the variables (v k )kE K may be interpreted
as Player 2's conditional security levels for each respective
kEK.
3.2 E-Bayesian Solutions
Suppose that one knows the optimal (;k)kEK then LP2 1S
decomposable and for each 11 E I the optimal y = ＨｙｾＩｪｅｊ 1S
a solution of the problem (denoted by LP2i):
kEK v -k
Ii EJ
[
jEJ
1y.
J
1y.
J
= 1
> 0
Now, the two linear programs LPl and LP2 are dual of each
other and the dual variables associated with the inequality
v -k
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Ｍ ｾThus if for some i e I and all k E K, x k = 0 (that ｾ ｳ Ｚ move ｾ
is non optimal for Player 1) then the constraints in the
associated LP2i problem are not binding at the optimum and
ordinarily this will result in non uniqueness for the optimal
Ｍ ｾy. The whole issue of resolving this non-uniqueness amounts
to defining a proper objective function for LP2i. We shall
now exhibit the objective functions associated with the three
extensions presented in section 2.
3.2.1. Extension 1
The idea in extension 1 is that every pure strategy
should be played with a small probability E. In this context
this amounts to impose the additional constraints in LPl:
k
x. > E
ｾ
k
Let {Yi)k K,
constraints.
. I be the dual variables associated with these
ｾ ｅ
Consequently LP2i becomes {assuming E small
enough so that the optimal (vp)kEK will remain unchanged)
kEK
E ｾ 1jEJ y. =J
jEJ ｾ > 0y.
J -
kEK k > 0y.
ｾ -
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kHence y. may be interpreted as the conditional penalty of
ｾ
playing move i in state k and Player 2's optimal behavioral
strategy will maximize the expected penalty given the a priori
probability distribution on k(pO = ＨｐｾＩｫｅｋＩ under the constraints
that each conditional penalty remains positive.
3.3.2. Extension 2
The idea in extension 2 is that the overall probability
of playing each move be a small probability E. In this
context this amounts to impose the additional constraints ｾ ｮ
LPI
E
kEK
k
x. > E
ｾ
Letting (y.). I be the dual variables associated with these
ｾ ｾ ｅ
constraints we obtain for LP2i:
Min - E y.
ｾ
ｾy. = 1
J
ｾjEJ y. > 0
J -
Hence Player 2's optimal behavioral strategy may be seen as
the solution of the matrix game I Ibkjl IkEK , jEJ with
o - ｾb kj = Pk (vk - a kj )· It is easily seen that this corresponds
to Dresher's approach in which Player 1 may only randomize
among the pure strategies which ｩ ｮ ｣ ｬ ｵ ､ ｾ to play move i in some
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state k whereas Player 2 is constrained to his optimal strategy
set. Note that for all states k in which a mistake is made,
3.2.3. Extension 3
The idea in extension 3 is that each personal information
set in the game tree should be reached with at least a small
probability E.
iEI
Thus the additional constraints in LPl are
Letting (v) be the dual variables associated with these
'i iEI
constraints, we obtain for LP2i:
Min - E y.
ｾ
kEK r ｾ ｾ > 0v k - ak·y· - y.J J ｾ -jEJ
jEJ
r
jEJ
iy.
J
ｾy.
J
= 1
> 0
Then Player 2's optimal behavioral solution is the solution
of the matrix game
3.3. Discussion
in which c kj = vk -
Given the preceding formalization it is quite easy to
determine what might be called E-Bayesian!! solutions in
simple examples. Indeed, as long as the number of states
"J:.! The term "Bayesian" is used to emphazise that these
extensions rely on mutually consistent optimal strategies for
the two players.
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remains equal to two,'a graphical analysis is ordinarily quite
sufficient. Here is such a graphical analysis which should
convey some intuitive feelings about the differences between
the three extensions.
-
o 1
FIGURE 2
In figure 2, we see that extension 1 is consistent with any
a posteriori probability within the line segment ｾ Ｒ Ｇ PI]
whereas extension 2 is only consistent with P2 and extension
3 with P3' (If we measure the"trickiness" of Player 1 by the
difference between the a priori and the a posterori probability
distribution this would suggest different levels of trickiness
in Player l's behavior associated with the different extension).
f -18-
Note also that as Po ｶ ｡ ｲ ｾ ･ ｳ inside the open line segment
(O, 1) {assume for simplicity of the argument that the
(;k)k£K remain constant) then the behavioral strategy assoc-
iated with extension 1 varies in a discrete fashion, whereas
it varies smoothly ｾ ｮ extension 2 and remains constant in
extension 3. Were Po to be an extreme point such as 0 then
vkl,becomes irrelevant and all three extensions coincide with
BSO, the intuitive solution of example 1 in section 2.
Finally note that only extension 3 will guarantee that
whatever the mistake it be penalized. That is, suppose p
o
is within (o, P4) then extensions 1 and 2 will not penalize
the mistake in state k l whereas extension 3 will. Formally
speaking, it is known that there exists an optimal strategy
for Player 2 such that for every pure strategy of Player 1
which is not part of his optimal strategy, the associated
expected payoff is strictly less than the value of the game
Q.-B-B] . Then extension 3 selects one such strategy.
So far we have been directly concerned with the case ｾ ｮ
which only one mistake is available to Player 1. If several
each mistake.
mistakes were available then as long as the {;k)k£K are
unique the problem is decomposable so that mistakes do not
interact with each other and the preceeding analysis apply to
If the (;k)kEK are non unique (and they are
non unique on a subset Q of the simplex
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1n which the dimension of Q 1S the dimension of P minus one)
then LP2 13 not decomposable and some problems may occur but
we shall refrain from going into this mathematical singularity.
4. More Examples
We shall conclude this paper by one example designed to
show the relevance of the ideas in more general extensive
games.
A two stage zero sum sequential game with incomplete
information.
There are two cards, say one white and one black, ｾ ｨ ｩ ｣ ｨ
will be presented in sequence to Player 1. The sequence is
chosen at random. Player 1 will announce the color of the
card and he may say the truth or lie. After each card ｾ ｳ
an noun c ｦｾ､ 1'layer ｾ Ｌ wi.11 GUY c orre c t or not c orr e ct.
stage payoff is given by the table
l':ach
.l'layer 2
Player 1 correct not correct
truth 0 1
lie 1 -1
Player 1 (Player 2) wants to maximize (minimize) the
expected payoff over the two stages.
intermediary payoffs are not revealed.
It is assumed that
If the first stage only were to be played then the value
would be 1/3 and the Players' optimal behavioral strategies
would be:
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Player 1 would say the truth with probability 2/3 and
lie with probability 1/3,
Player 2 would say correct with probability 2/3 and
incorrect with probability 1/3.
Now in the two stage game the value is 2/3 [p-z]. Player lIs
optimal behavioral strategy at the first stage IS unchanged
whereas at the second stage he should announce the color he
did not announce at the first stage (in other words, Player 1
should remaIn consistent with himself: lie twice or say the
2nd stage:
truth twice). Player 2's optimal behavioral strategy on the
other hand iR non unIque. He may merely repeat twice his
one stage optimal behavioral strategy but this will not
penalize mistakes by Player 1 such as announced sequences
" whit L', wh i Lc" 0 t" "l> l:l. c k, ld a c k" whie h ub V" i u ＱＱｾＬ 1 yeLl. 11 I j \) t IJ L'
true.
ApplicationR of the extensions proposed in sectioll
3 will lead to the following £-Bayesian solutions:
1st stage: say correct with probability 1/3 and
incorrect with probability 2/3.
if Player 1 reverses his announcements (after
announcing "white" he says "black" or vice
versa) then always say correct.
If Player 1 does not reverse his announcement and thus commits
a mistake then according to extension 1 he should always say
incorrect and according to extensions 2 or 3 he should say
correct with probability 1/3 and incorrect with probability2/3.
-21-
(
r
The interesting feature of this example ｾ ｳ that to be
ｾ ｮ a position to exploit a possible mistake, Player 2 has
to anticipate it. Were he to simply play his one stage
minimax strategy at the first stage (1/3 correct + 2/3
incorrect) then the penalization of the mistake would be
impossible.
A similar example but more complicated so that it cannot
be reproduced here is Kuhn's Simplified Poker [K]. This
example may serve as a good conclusion: starting with a
game in extensive form Kuhn's derives 12 extremal optimal
mixed strategies for Player 1, this reduces to a one para-
meter family in terms of optimal behavioral strategies. Again
this non uniqueness is associated with the ｰ ｯ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ of non
optimal play by Player 2 and may be resolved along the lines
developed in this paper (the interested reader will verify
that the E-Bayesian solutions require the use of underbidding,
namely passing with a high card. It is not hard to give an
intuitive justification of such a behavior: it may attract
the mistaken player into betting with a medium hand whereas
his optimal strategy calls for passing).
[A-B-B]
[D]
[P-iJ
Q?-Z]
[W]
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